Migration from Africa to Europe dominates political debate and drives EU policy innovation, but many strategies are inadequate. The main reason is that it will fail to include Africans, especially West Africans, in meaningful ways. European policies frame the transition as a crisis of control, often focusing on border security and deterrence. While shaped by domestic political pressures, this narrow view overlooks the deeper reality behind migration, economic aspirations, local mobility and demographic trends. To develop more effective and balanced policies, Europe must go beyond the euro-centric approach to engage African voices as equal partners in shaping transition solutions.
Securitization Trap
EU policymakers have been increasingly migrating through security lenses since the 2015 refugee crisis. It focuses on budget boundaries, migration compacts and readmission contracts, including strengthening coastal security capacity in Libya and Senegal, strengthening surveillance technology in Mauritania, and incentives to join the Niger government to the Sahelian government. These measures could slow down maritime crossings or desert routes in the short term, but they rest on flawed premises. That transition is primarily a matter that should be managed, rather than a complex social process shaped by economic, demographics, and transnational networks. Therefore, European actors have little incentive to invest in a bottom-up approach of consulting that incorporates local knowledge, positive mobility frameworks, or structural factors of movement. This often obscures development cooperation or mobility partnerships that may reflect shared interests, despite the emphasis on the need for African leaders to link migration governance with poverty reduction, education and livelihoods.
The transition presents equally sophisticated security challenges for the Sahel countries and is closely intertwined with escalating terrorism and instability in the region. In response, these states are increasingly pursuing an increasingly community-centric strategy that emphasizes information sharing, cross-border collaboration and local resilience. We recognize that this approach often exacerbates the very tensions they are trying to control, not just the relationships between neighboring countries. Instead, promoting economic development, particularly in vulnerable border regions, is viewed as essential to reducing both irregular migration and the appeal of extremist groups. However, this more holistic approach progresses, but its effectiveness remains uneven and is undermined by persistent uncertainty, political instability, and limited state capabilities.
Colonial heritage and unequal partnerships
Europe's involvement with West Africa is plagued by colonial heritage. Even when Brussels talks about “partnerships,” negotiations often unfold on terms set by the EU. The packages and conditions of financial aid highlight the imbalance and pilot the West African government towards European-defined objectives. These focus on border control and reinstatement cooperation. Development priorities in African countries such as regional integration, youth employment, and rural infrastructure will be less trusted and funded. Recently, cooperation has become a deal. Financial assistance in exchange for readmission agreements or stricter border controls. Furthermore, the EU's emphasis on state actors is on the sidelines of the living civil society organizations, local researchers and diaspora communities where experience and insights can enrich policy design. This top-down approach reflects colonial dynamics and perpetuates and undermines the legitimacy of policy interventions on both sides of the issue. The EU AFRICA Immigration Agreement is negotiated with substantive opinions from African civil society, immigrants themselves, or from a wider government sector beyond the Ministry of Home Affairs, such as the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and the Bilateral Transactions. Furthermore, African elites often use these unequal partnerships to promote their interests, usually silence domestic opposition or promote oppressive policies against civil society and non-governmental organizations.
Changes in geopolitical reality shape how West African countries are approaching primarily migration and security cooperation. More and more, the Saheria province is not primarily aiming for Europe. Instead, traditional partnerships with European forces are exposed to the growth of scrutiny, supported by political transitions, heightened anti-foreign sentiment, and changes that demand a young, dynamic population. Recent regime changes in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have strengthened the demand for alternative partnerships and increased autonomy to address regional challenges. At the same time, disinformation and historical dissatisfaction have contributed to the growing skepticism of European involvement. These dynamics complicate transition governance and counterterrorism efforts as European priorities, a model of cooperation rooted in transition policies focused on containment, faces declining legitimacy on the ground.
Towards a comprehensive, Africa-led policy dialogue
Focusing African voices on immigration debate does not imply an inevitable conflict between African and European interests. Our research shows that even challenging issues such as restrictive migration policies, there is a real possibility of a common foundation when cooperation is approached in a balanced manner with respect. For a transition strategy to be effective and humane, the EU must move beyond a top-down security-first approach and truly recognize Africa's expertise and priorities. This starts with holding transition talks under existing initiatives such as the African Union and ECOWAS, or Khartoum and Rabat process, ensuring that these spaces reflect true partnerships rather than European domination. It also means expanding the conversation beyond politicians to include African researchers, civil society, immigrant communities and diaspora. Local knowledge should shape policies that require investment in African universities, think tanks and institutions, rather than outsourcing expertise to European consultants. Practical solutions such as circular transition, student exchange, and support for legal pathways for work can help reduce irregular migration to suit African aspirations. Importantly, European initiatives must support, rather than undermine, regional frameworks like ECOWAS's free mobility protocol.
In reality, the migration between Africa and Europe has not disappeared. It is driven by deep economic ties, demographic changes and the agenda of shared environments, and the amount of border control cannot change it. However, when European policymakers design strategies without meaningful African input, they risk repeating the same old mistakes. Instead, Europe has the opportunity to reset the conversation. The transition can be reframed, especially by focusing African voices from West Africa and making the most of existing partnerships. This means moving away from a defensive, security-heavy approach to long-term rights-based cooperation that is tailored to both sides. But that change requires more than words, requiring Europe to embrace the voices of Africa's political institutions, regional leadership and youth. Until Africa's perspective is fully integrated into the transition policy, the EU's strategy will be incomplete, inconsistent and not in contact with realities on earth.
