As militias expand and stability deteriorate, the Rome transition could be resolved with Tripoli.
In a nutshell, put it in a nutshell
The Italian deal with Libya relies on the governance structure of militia control. Realpolitic Compromise Rome's Reliability and Regional Impact Meloni delayed migration, but Tripoli's challenges revert to the benefits for comprehensive insights and AI-Powed Podcasts can be adjusted here
Since taking power in 2022, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has focused on foreign policy. Among the top priorities of her international agenda is Africa, and more specifically Libya. In light of the energy crisis caused by the increasingly political (not purely demographic) nature of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the immigrant flow, Libya has regained its strategic connection with Rome.
Prime Minister Meloni's vision was officially launched at the end of 2023 and clearly laid out in the “Mattei Project of Africa,” an international cooperation project inspired by Enricomattei, the founder of Italian petrochemical giant Enni. It envisions an equal and mutually beneficial partnership between Italy and Africa. The plan is essentially divided into six investment areas: energy (renewable energy, gas, rural electrification), infrastructure (ports, roads, water networks), health (hospitals, medical training), education and vocational training, agricultural development and food security, and of course mobility management.
Major Italian companies working with Rome in Africa's engagement programme include Enni, National Aerospace Champion Leonardo and natural gas system operator SNAM. The major beneficiaries are Libya, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Ivory Coast, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
What is currently attracting attention is Italy's approach in one of these target countries. Libya is on the rise in violence, short sh is paid to human rights by those who retain power and do business, allowing them to unravel existing power structures.
What Italy accomplished in Libya
Italy – Until Enni – In January 2023, he signed a contract worth 8 billion euros with Libya's National Petroleum Corporation and Tripoli's National Unified Government, chaired by Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dobeibe. Over the next two years, Libyan coast guards were strengthened through the supply of Italian patrol boats, but the detention centres for illegal immigration on Libyan territory continue to operate and run by local militias. These efforts have resulted in a sharp decline in illegal immigration to Italy. The arrival of immigrants last year fell 60% compared to the previous year.
In October 2024, the Italian Libyan Business Forum took place in Tripoli, during which contracts were signed in strategic sectors such as energy, fishing, healthcare, infrastructure and specialized training. The country has also announced the resumption of direct flights between Italy and Libya.
While these contracts seem reliable, it is important to note that dealing with current leadership in Libya presents many types of serious issues. Since the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya's governance has been unstable, with the country splitting into two, with half each under the control of rival regimes.
To the west is the National Unity Government (GNU) of Tripoli. Tripoli is primarily alongside Türkiye and enjoys support from the United Nations, Qatar, Algeria and Pakistan. It has been accused of maintaining relations between Islamic extremism and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Located in the eastern part of the country, the National Stable Government (GNS) is led by former Khalifa Haftar field, along with Libyan national army and foreign powers such as Egypt, Russia and the United Arab Emirates, with the support of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives.
The problem of militia
The GNU agreed to stop Rome's northward movement – ostensibly retains power in the western half of the country, but the reins of power are contested. At a political conference held in Tripoli on May 12, Abdulganiaal Kikuri, the leader of the Stability Support Device (SSA), one of the most powerful militias in western Libya, was shot dead at the headquarters of another important militia, the 444th Brigade. The main figures in the GNU security facilities and leaders of the Misratan Brigade, one of the nation's largest armed factions, all attended the meeting.
The bold assassination paints a harsh picture of someone who truly holds power in Tripoli. Al Kikli was shot dead in front of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Minister of Home Affairs. After the murder, the city descended into chaos before it settled down. However, large tombs have been revealed since then, indicating that the Roman-associated Libyan regime is turning a blind eye to torture and ultra-legal killings.
Furthermore, when power was contested, another large militia, Special Deterrent Forces (RADA), took part in the fight. The group is led by Abdurauf Kala, a person associated with Osama Almasri Nazim, who was at the heart of the international scandal. Nazim was arrested in Turin on an international criminal court arrest warrant for war crimes and crimes against humanity, but in January he was released from Italian custody and returned to Libya on an Italian provincial flight.
The decision sparked rage within Italy, with critics accusing Meloni's government of bypassing international justice and working with Tripoli's criminal militia network.
In particular, Nazim was at the time the head of Libyan judicial police. Ironically, it was not Italian Minister of Justice Carlo Nordio, but Libyan Prime Minister Dobeibe himself, who made a surprising announcement on May 15 that he had accepted the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and pledged to hand over the figures of Mr Nazim and other non-compliant militias. Dbeibeh's aired statement was clear when he alleged that certain militias “growed excessively until they controlled the entire political, economic and social landscape.” This is a turning point in GNU's internal politics and complicates Meloni's efforts in North Africa.
Italian connections and the dilemma of real politicalism
What makes the situation even more problematic for the Italian government is the discovery of Arquichli in Rome, as in March, two months after the Nazim incident. He accompanied Ibrahim Dobeibe, the Prime Minister's adviser and nephew. They visited the Minister of Cabinet Secretary in Libyan. Adel Jumer was admitted to European hospital via Portens after being injured in a gun attack in Tripoli.
This public figure sparked rage at Italian opposition and highlighted the controversial relationship between the Italian government and Libyan warlords. Historically, Al-Kikuri played a key role in the “Rage Volcano” military campaign defending Tripoli against the 2019 attack led by Field Marshall Haftar. Originally approved by the President's Council, Arquikuli's SSA militia was integrated into Tripoli-based agencies, such as the Ministry of Interior. He gradually expanded the west and east regions of Tripoli (Gallics and Zuriten), undoubtedly becoming too powerful.
Counter – Read more by Esurgery Expert Federica Saini Fasanotti
Many observers interpreted his exclusion as the first major change in Tripoli's security dynamics since August 2022. This highlights the fundamental issues facing the Meloni government.
Since the 2017 Memorandum of Understanding Italy Libyan Italy (initiated by then Minister Marcominiti), the Italian governments on the left and right have partnered with local militias to curb smuggling and relocation. The arrival of migrants has declined, but the moral status of Italy has also declined upon accusations that they have strengthened militias at the expense of Libya's institutional stability. Today, it appears that they are making a similar trade-off under Italian Prime Minister Meloni.
The current problem is similar to the previous problem. In other words, control of travel routes is a strategic node of human trafficking to Italy, and is currently overseen by the militia mentioned above. The vulnerability of local interlocutors undermines consistently the durability and effectiveness of any agreement between Italian and Libyan decision makers. The Roman approach is marked by ambiguity as it involves both the GNU, based in Dubaibe, based in Tripoli, and the authorities based in the eastern part of Tobruk, including General Haftar.
This double-track diplomacy has weakened Rome's leverage in the eyes of more assertive players such as Türkiye and Russia. Recently, I have joined Belarus, at least rhetorically. The results speak for itself. Furthermore, the endemic instability of Libya and the endemic nature of other countries in the Matti Program (particularly not just Ethiopia, but also the Democratic Republics of the Congo and Mozambique) threaten to undermine the basis of Italy's long-term cooperation strategy in Africa.
scenario
For years after the death of Strongman leader Qaddafi, Italy's political involvement with Libya has been characterized by a conflict between pragmatism and ethics. As a result, the real question is whether Prime Minister Meloni can navigate a medium- to long-term strategy that is economically productive, reduces migration and at the same time respects human rights.
Impossible: Meloni succeeds as a power player by reducing transitions
The most attractive scenario, although most attractive, believes Italy is rising to the role of a true international mediator with progress in Libya's internal political dialogue, improving migration flows and improving conditions for the exile itself. However, such advancements will require greater stabilization in Libya, which is now “protostate,” fragmented and feudal, than in functioning democracy. So this result is unlikely.
Possibility: Meloni can't notice that her vision and transitions will soar again
A more likely outcome is that despite the superficial mildness in Tripoli, the risk of new violence is real. If Dbeibeh's government collapses under militia pressure, if this is a real possibility, then the existing immigration contracts will be unraveled. It will leave a power vacuum that could be filled by General Haftar. They are forced to renegotiate the deal under less favorable terms and endanger further reputational damage.
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