From July 9 to 11, 2025, U.S.
President Donald Trump hosted a high-level summit in Washington with the five
Atlantic-facing West African nations – Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau,
Liberia, and Gabon. The summit featured a series of official events, including
both bilateral and multilateral working sessions as well as closed-door
meetings. These events addressed economic issues, security, and migration,
reflecting the U.S. administration’s interest in forging close, mutually
beneficial relationships with African countries.
Preparations had been underway for
months. In April 2025, signals from the White House indicated that the
administration was beginning to reset its Africa policy: it was cutting
spending on diplomatic presence and support in areas such as climate change
mitigation, democracy and human rights, and humanitarian aid, in order to focus
on other top priorities — chief among them security and economic partnership,
especially in critical minerals. The shift aligned consistently with Executive Order
14169, issued by President Trump in the early days of his second term and
titled “Reevaluating U.S. Foreign Aid,” which put all U.S. foreign aid programs
worldwide on hold for 90 days.
Multiple
Objectives
Since Donald Trump’s return to the
presidency in January 2025, the United States has taken a series of rapid steps
signaling a profound transformation in the structure of its relations with
Africa. Numerous indicators highlight this shift: Washington has moved beyond
the traditional model of engagement that primarily relied on humanitarian
assistance, mostly channeled through the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), and has instead initiated a new phase built on mutually
beneficial partnerships and reciprocal gains.
The transformation extends beyond
merely abandoning the aid-based framework. The most recent U.S.-Africa summit
came just days after Washington brokered a peace agreement between the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda — an initiative aimed not only at
restoring peace and stability in the Great Lakes region but also accompanied by
the announcement of a major, long-term investment plan led by the United States
and its Western partners.
Such backdrop provided solid ground
for launching the U.S-Africa summit, which targeted economically and
strategically significant countries in West Africa. Its broader goal was to
transition Washington’s engagement with Africa from aid dependence to
partnerships driven by shared economic interests.
The summit’s key objectives can be
outlined as follows:
1-
Strengthening economic partnerships, especially in critical minerals:
Securing U.S. access to critical
minerals is a priority for the Trump administration, particularly with African
countries that hold large global reserves of many such minerals. All five
summit participants offer valuable resources: Gabon stands as the world’s
second-largest producer of manganese, holding about 25% of the known global
reserves of this essential metal used in steelmaking and batteries. Gabon’s
President Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema announced that the country will ban
exports of raw manganese starting in 2029, in an effort to boost revenue by
doubling local value addition through public and private investment.
Recent discoveries have confirmed that
Liberia possesses enormous mineral deposits — including gold, diamonds, iron
ore, lithium, cobalt, manganese, and neodymium — expected to attract roughly $3
billion in new international investment. Senegal, for its part, has significant
reserves of phosphate, zircon, and titanium, making it a prime candidate for
expanded economic ties with the United States. Mauritania is likewise rich in
gold, phosphate, copper, and iron, along with significant uranium deposits.
2-
Competing with China’s economic presence:
The U.S. selection of those five
African countries was closely tied to the strategic goal of competing with
China’s growing influence in Africa. For example, China has become Gabon’s top
trading partner – importing around 22% of its manganese – and the two countries
signed investment agreements worth more than $4.3 billion last year. In
Guinea-Bissau, China has played a central role in developing the country’s
infrastructure, including building its only highway and its main fishing port
and other projects.
In 2023, China forgave $21 million of
Mauritania’s debt and expanded cooperation under its Belt and Road Initiative,
which has funded new roads, bridges, and various infrastructure projects in the
country. In April 2025, China and Mauritania signed a new $27.5 billion agreement
to finance development projects, and simultaneously announced that all
Mauritanian exports to China would be exempt from tariffs.
In Senegal, by 2024 China had
overtaken France as the country’s leading trading partner, with its exports to
Dakar primarily consisting of electronic equipment, machinery, and vehicles. In
June 2025, Senegalese Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko met with Chinese President
Xi Jinping to renew bilateral cooperation, highlighting opportunities for
Chinese companies to invest in Senegal’s large phosphate, zircon, and titanium
reserves.
3-
Prioritizing Atlantic-facing countries (geographic selectivity):
The United States deliberately chose
five Atlantic-facing African countries for this summit – three contiguous
(Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau) and two on the Gulf of Guinea (Liberia and
Gabon). The selection reflects the United States’ deliberate focus on elevating
maritime security and international navigation to the forefront of its
priorities in Africa—particularly given the strategic location of the five
participating countries along key maritime routes leading to both the United
States and Europe.
The geographic selectivity was not
unexpected. Rather, it aligns with long-standing U.S. priorities in security
and military cooperation in the region. For example, forces from Gabon and
Guinea-Bissau have participated in training programs since 2023 led by U.S.
Africa Command (AFRICOM), the U.S. Army, and the National Guard. Guinea-Bissau
signed a defense cooperation agreement with Washington in 2023, providing a
legal framework for security collaboration, training, and military assistance.
The U.S. also helped build two new
radar-monitoring stations in Gabon and supplied patrol boats to the Gabonese
navy in 2024. Similarly, Washington has long-standing partnerships with
Mauritania and Senegal: Mauritania regularly joins the annual Flintlock
counterterrorism exercise organized by AFRICOM, and Senegal signed a 2016
defense agreement with the U.S. to allow use of Senegalese facilities for joint
exercises and crisis response. Both Mauritania and Senegal participated in the
U.S.-led “African Lion” military exercises in 2025.
4-
Encouraging African acceptance of Trump’s migrant repatriation plan:
During the summit, the United States
emphasized that African countries should cooperate in accepting migrants
deported from the U.S., a top priority for the Trump administration. Washington
pointed to Mauritania’s 2024 agreement with the European Union on curbing
migration flows in exchange for $600 million in investments, and to EU-funded
development projects in Senegal totaling over $235 million since 2015.
In his opening remarks at the summit,
President Trump expressed hope of reducing the high rates of people remaining
in the U.S. after their visas expire by advancing “safe third-country”
agreements. Such agreements would allow migrants to be transferred safely and
quickly from the U.S., with the receiving countries committing not to send them
back to their home countries or countries of residence until a final decision
is made on their U.S. asylum claims.
The stance remains consistent with
efforts by the U.S. Department of State since early 2025 to inform African
governments that hosting third-country nationals is the administration’s top
priority — cooperation on which is viewed as crucial to strengthening trade
ties with the United States (this message was delivered even to African
countries not attending the summit, such as Rwanda, Benin, and Eswatini).
Conflicting
Outcomes
Despite the political and diplomatic
momentum surrounding the U.S.-Africa summit, its outcomes were mixed. While
certain aspects signaled progress, the summit also exposed a number of
underlying tensions, as outlined below:
1-
Reactivating U.S.–Africa engagement:
After years of stagnation and decline
during President Trump’s first term and the subsequent administration of
President Biden, the summit revived high-level political interaction between
Washington and African capitals, focusing once again on development and
economic partnerships. The positive momentum was further bolstered by
Washington’s successful mediation of a peace agreement between the Democratic
Republic of Congo and Rwanda on June 27, which relatively enhanced America’s
image as a constructive mediator in complex and intractable African conflicts.
Given the summit’s indications that
the U.S. intends to make its presence in Africa more practical and responsive
to African needs, expectations suggest that this meeting will be followed by a
series of further engagements along the same positive path.
2-
Reinforcing the shift to economic partnerships over humanitarian aid:
The Washington summit underscored the
strategic shift in U.S. policy from a model focused on humanitarian assistance
to one emphasizing mutually beneficial partnerships. The change was reflected
in the Trump administration’s effort to reframe the decision to suspend USAID
operations — not as evidence of the United States abandoning its African
partners, but rather as signaling the end of an era of foreign policy overly
fixated on humanitarian concerns instead of shared economic interests.
U.S. officials argued that the
previous approach was unsustainable and did not foster genuine growth. Instead,
the summit sought to crystallize the U.S. approach of intensifying reliance on
investment tools and sustainable economic partnerships with African nations—an
attempt to rebuild American influence through the gateway of economics and
investment.
3- Drawing
negative popular and elite reactions:
The summit provoked widespread
discontent among both African publics and elites. Critics pointed to what they
perceived as President Trump’s condescending behavior — for example, cutting
short the speaking time of African leaders and expressing surprise at the Liberian
president’s command of English. African commentators rejected the
Washington-centric view of Africa as merely a source of raw materials rather
than as an equal partner.
Human rights organizations also
criticized the summit, arguing that U.S. economic interests were dominating at
the expense of African priorities. Popular campaigns launched in each
participating country demanded transparency regarding the migration agreements,
amid fears that the concessions to the United States could undermine national
sovereignty. Even outside the summit, the reaction was highly negative: at the
BRICS summit in Brazil, Nigerian Foreign Minister Yusuf Tuggar announced that
Nigeria would refuse to accept migrants deported from the United States — a
direct rebuttal of the American plan.
4-
Confirming U.S. neglect of major sub-Saharan powers:
The list of invitees made clear a
shift away from engaging Africa’s major regional players — such as South
Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Kenya — toward bolstering ties with nations that
are smaller in terms of capabilities and influence. The strategy appears
motivated by the Trump administration’s desire to forge new alliances with
countries perceived to have simpler domestic dynamics and to be more responsive
to U.S. demands, especially on security and economic issues.
However, such approach could backfire:
by ignoring Africa’s big powers, the United States risks undermining its
credibility with them and pushing them toward deeper ties with other global
powers like China and Russia, particularly amid growing feelings of U.S.
neglect — a sentiment already reinforced by Trump’s policies during his first
term.
In conclusion, the outcomes of the U.S.-Africa summit
reflect the delicate balance between Washington’s ambition to reposition itself
strategically on the continent and the enduring contradictions between American
rhetoric and practice. On the one hand, the summit renewed U.S. engagement with
Africa and proposed a new economic vision based on mutual interests. On the
other hand, it exposed a structural flaw in the U.S. perspective on African
countries and prompted critical reactions from African publics and elites.
Moreover, the exclusion of the
continent’s major powers from the meeting raises questions about the wisdom of
building new alliances at the expense of traditional partners. Thus, the summit
represents an important first step on a complex journey — one that will require
Washington to reassess its objectives and methods if it hopes to establish a
more stable and sustainable presence in Africa.
