Spanish investigators revealed that the assistant officer of the Luftanza Airbus A321 had a serious attack on his own in the cockpit for 10 minutes.
The incident occurred on a 35,000-foot cruise between Garb and Banev's waypoint in northern Spain on February 17th last year, as Twinjet (D-Aiso) flew from Frankfurt to Seville.
Ciaiac, of the Spanish Bureau of Investigation, says that just 36 seconds after the captain left the bathroom cockpit, the assistant officer experienced “suddenly serious incompetence.”
The investigation found that the assistant officer had a neurological condition undetected himself or during previous aviation testing, which disqualified the pilot from obtaining medical fitness.
Ciaiac says the captain briefly discussed weather conditions with his assistant officer before leaving FlightDeck. The first mate appeared in “ability and vigilance” and the captain was unaware of anything unusual in his actions.
However, shortly after being left alone, the first mate, who had held a valid Class 1 medical certificate at age 38 without restriction, was so suddenly unconscious that he could not warn others of the situation.
In the first 46 seconds of the start of the seizure, one of the spoiler elevator computers was disconnected, triggering four inboard spoilers, a pair on both sides, and a warning. The weather radar operation mode has been changed and the audio control panel switch is now active.
Also, the force on the right rudder pedal suddenly increased to 488n, which was enough to generate a “stop rudder input” warning, but not enough for the threshold to release the autopilot. The input of the pedal changed the way we viewed 5° roll and 2°, and compensated for the autopilot.
The aircraft passed through the Banev Waypoint and approached the PAU-TLU boundary in the middle of Sectors, and air traffic control attempted to contact the crew for a handover three times.
When the captain tried to return to the cockpit, the first mate initially failed to respond to requests for re-entry and was unable to reach the cabin crew.
After trying the entry code procedure up to five times and spending nearly 2 minutes and 30 seconds, the captain returned to the emergency code. This includes waiting for a fixed time delay, but the assistant officer unlocked the door before it expired.
The captain reentered the cockpit ten minutes after the first mate's seizure, took control of the aircraft and reestablished communication with air traffic control.
“The (first mate) was pale, sweaty and strangely moving, so the captain sought help from the cabin crew,” the investigation says. First aid was provided by the crew and doctors who diagnosed the possible heart condition, and the captain began diverting to Madrid Barajas Airport. The A321 landed 20 minutes later. None of the 205 residents were injured.
The first mate had no recollections from the period of incapacity. “He remembered flying through Zaragosa and the next thing is, he was in attendance with the cabin crew and the doctor,” the investigation said.
As a precaution, medical certificates for equal officers have been suspended. According to the AESA of the Spanish National Safety Agency, his illness was detectable or appeared beforehand during the illness only if symptoms were present at the time.
After the fatal crash of the A320, operated by Germanwings, a subsidiary of Lufthansa Group, the carrier was instructed to assess the security risks associated with a single pilot left in the cockpit.
Lufthansa initially responded by constantly requesting two permitted people in the cockpit, but while members of the cabin crew have replaced the pilot temporarily without absent, the airline subsequently changed its procedures after deeming it unsafe to operate. At the time of the A321 outbreak, there was no need for two people to be present in the cockpit on a continuous basis.
CIAIAC recommends that the European Union Aviation Safety Agency notify correspondents of incidents to assist in risk analysis.
“We believe it is appropriate to communicate the peculiarity of this incapacity to the operator, so we can reassess the risks associated with the pilots that remain alone in the flight deck,” he said.
